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ABSTRACT
A bank’s lending decision is affected by the amount of information it can access and by its capability to manage this
information. The latter aspect implies that the bank has to decide whether borrowers should be managed in a local
branch of the bank or in its headquarters. By looking at a sample of Finnish banks, the present research investigates a
bank’s capability to extract profitability from both locally and centrally managed firms. We find that banks are able to
properly discriminate between firms: those which should be managed by loan managers with expert knowledge in the
bank’s headquarters due to their complexity, and those firms which should be managed in the bank’s local branch
because they are simpler and need standard products and services. As a result, banks are able to extract risk-adjusted
profitability (RAP) from both centrally and locally managed customers. Our findings clearly support the argument that
the decision to centralise or decentralise the lending decision process is not an either/or decision: banks should implement
both approaches and apply according to the type of firm they serve.
Keywords: Small Firms, Local Banks, Transaction Lending, Relationship Lending Risk- Adjusted Profitability
JEL Codes: G21, G24

I.
Introduction
When Florentine bankers decided to increase the loans provided to England in the 1330s, the
English crown’s finances were already in dire straits because of the adverse outcomes of the wars in
France. Retrospectively, it is therefore not a surprise that the default of the English crown in 1340
helped drive the Peruzzi out of business in 1343 and the Compagnia de’ Bardi in 1346. Had they
been able to access more information and to analyse this information properly, it is very likely that
they would have behaved differently (Cipolla 1994, 2002). This is one of many examples in the
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history of finance that illustrates the importance of accessing and analysing information in order to
evaluate the creditworthiness of the borrower correctly.
Today, banks are aware of the key role played by information and of the risk they incur when
they evaluate the borrowers’ creditworthiness naively. This is particularly true in the case of small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which are characterised by a high level of opaqueness due to the
limited information available about them (Berger and Frame 2007; Berger et al. 2001; Mason and
Stark 2004). In order to reduce information asymmetries between a bank and a SME, loan managers
aim to collect additional information that helps them to assess the SME’s creditworthiness. Previous
research suggests that a loan manager’s ability to do so depends on various factors, which can be
grouped into two major categories: (i) the characteristics of the market, the bank or the SME, and (ii)
the characteristics of the relationship between the SME and the bank. With regard to the first
category, scholars stress the role of the concentration of the financial system (Neuberger et al. 2008),
since a more concentrated financial system makes it easier for the bank to access detailed information
about the customer. Furthermore, the geographic distance between the bank and the borrower plays
an important role in accessing information, as banks find it harder to collect information from
distant customers (Alessandrini et al. 2009; DeYoung et al. 2008; Petersen and Rajan 2002).
Moreover, earlier research finds that the age of the firm is a relevant factor. Younger firms are more
affected by information asymmetry, as they do not have an established track record in terms of
performance that can be used to evaluate the management capabilities required to be successful in the
future (Angelini et al. 1998; Petersen and Rajan 1994). As far as the second category, i.e. the
relationship between the SME and the bank, is concerned, research highlights the roles of the length
and the breadth of the relationship (Berger and Udell 1995; Elsas 2005; Petersen and Rajan 1994,
1995). Stronger relationships make it more difficult for the customer to hide information and easier
for the bank to access additional information about the customer’s performance (Howorth et al.
2003). However, strong relationships may lead to hold-up costs for firms (Farinha and Santos 2002;
Greenbaum et al. 1989; Rajan 1992; Sharpe 1990), as banks may accumulate private information to
gain monopolistic power to deter their competitors (Berger and Udell 1995; Petersen and Rajan
1994). This private information leads to reduced information asymmetry between firms and banks,
thus enabling banks to set competitive pricing strategies (Bharath et al. 2007, 2011; Cerqueiro et al.
2011). Uchida et al. (2012) suggest that loan managers play a key role in collecting private
information because of their repeated interactions with the same firm over time.
A bank’s lending decision is the result of a sequential information production process. Banks
have to structure this process in order to respond to the challenges posed by processing the collected
information. Danos et al. (1989) divide the bank’s lending decision process into three phases: (i) the
examination of publicly available data about a firm, (ii) the personal examination of the firm’s
operations, and (iii) the analysis of likelihood for the loan to be repaid. The findings of Stein (2002)
suggest that the organisational form determines the preferential use of hard or soft information and
that the use of hard or soft information, in turn, affects lending opportunities. In order to benefit
from lending opportunities, banks have to differentiate between the duties of decentralised and
centralised loan managers. Lending decisions that are primarily based on soft information should be
taken locally, whereas lending decision that are primarily based on hard information should be taken
centrally. The work by Liberti and Mian (2009) supports this argument. The authors show that
subjective information, for example un-quantified soft information, is difficult to use across
organisational layers due to problems in transferring that information. Due to these problems in
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communicating across hierarchies, the delegating of a firm to a local or central loan manager should
depend on the nature of available information.
All in all, previous research suggests the way in which banks decide to treat a loan application
is an endogenous decision: banks first categorise their borrowers according to the nature of the
available information and then select a subset of loan applications for more rigorous analysis if
additional information about a firm is required. Banks employ this procedure because the additional
analysis is not free of charge, as the time and effort needed in order to take the final lending decision
generates additional costs for the bank. Thus, the additional information can have an effect on both
the lending and the pricing decision, which is reflected in the profits a bank can derive from a
specific customer (Liberti and Mian 2009; Uchida et al. 2012). This implies that banks should
manage loan applications centrally if the benefits gained due to a better creditor evaluation and better
pricing exceed the incremental costs linked to information processing because of the involvement of
highly skilled loan managers, who spend a lot of time on their analysis. Interestingly, current research
has not investigated such cost–benefit implications of the lending process.
II.
Hypotheses
Building on Stein's (2002) notion of hierarchical and local information processing, we argue
that loan managers who operate centrally are able to analyse firms in more detail than local managers
and are thus able to generate additional value for the bank. This is due to the following reasons. First,
loan managers who operate centrally provide support to multiple local branches and may therefore
have a better overall picture of lending contracts and the level of competition in the market. This
additional information allows them to make better-informed lending decisions as well as decisions on
the price of the loans. Second, the risk management of complex funding transactions needs to be
handled by loan managers with expert knowledge. Loan managers who operate locally tend to deal
with a plethora of different customers, e.g. firms operating in different industries, who have various
needs – loans being just one of those needs. In order to be able to respond to these needs, they need
to have broad banking and finance knowledge. However, due to this broad knowledge local loan
managers may lack the expert knowledge required for more complex funding transactions. Third,
loan managers who operate centrally are typically more experienced in coping with information
asymmetries, since they are more likely to have hard information available about the borrower (Stein
2002). Nevertheless, particularly in banks with flat hierarchical structures soft information – that is
hardened by quantifying it to a measurable form (Petersen 2004) – can also be transferred from local
loan managers to loan managers who operate centrally. In addition, loan manager who operate
centrally might be able to access additional soft information about customers, for example, by
looking at the interaction between the respective customer and its business partners who also happen
to be customers of the bank. We therefore expect that limited access to soft information can be
overcome due to the additional skills of centrally operating loan managers.
If the process is effective, the thorough examination of a customer should allow the bank to
select the right “problematic” customer, i.e. the customer who might be complex to evaluate, but
who is creditworthy, and also price the loan correctly. We also argue, in line with Garicano (2000),
that the loan managers’ expert knowledge increases the further up the hierarchical ladder they are
found. This expert knowledge may not only enable centrally operating loan managers to assess
borrower risk more accurately than loan managers who operate locally, but also to generate
incremental risk-adjusted profitability (RAP) for the bank, with RAP being defined as the margin
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generated by the customer, taking into account the level of risk incurred by the bank in dealing with
the customer. Based on these arguments, we propose the following hypothesis:
H1: Centrally operating loan managers with expert knowledge are able to generate RAP for their
bank.
If hypothesis 1 is supported, it provides evidence that banks are able to extract RAP from
centrally managed customers, but does not tell us anything about the reasons why. We argue that
banks should not treat all customers centrally, but only the more problematic ones. Thus, banks
should not only allocate customers to central or local loan managers according to the information
available about them, but also according to their risk profile. As a consequence, centrally operating
loan managers with expert knowledge should employ their expertise to evaluate the more complex
and opaque and therefore riskier customers. In contrast, locally operating loan managers with broad
knowledge should capitalise the soft information gathered through their personal relationships with
the customer in order to provide not only loans, but also other financial products. Thus, we
hypothesise that:
H2: Centrally operating loan managers with expert knowledge manage only “high risk” customers
in order to extract RAP from them.
III.

Data and Methodology

A.
Data
This research is based on a sample of privately owned SMEs domiciled in Finland. The loan
database incorporates 2,522 SME-year observations from the financial period of December 2001 to
December 2005. The data were provided by 21 small local cooperative banks. All the banks in the
sample have a few branches and short lines of command. They tend to rely on deposits (since they
are small, they are not able to approach regulated markets) and have very similar asset-liability mixes
(they all tend to finance local households and small local firms). Moreover, the banks in the sample
operate in a context characterised by limited competition. All in all, our sample is made up of banks
that are similar, not only in terms of their cost structure, deposit and credit strategy, and assetliability mix, but also in terms of their management objectives and style, operating efficiency, market
served, etc. In line with prior literature, the sample includes only non-financial SMEs.
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Table 1. Market Characteristics
This table presents the Finnish credit market for lending and guarantees (in million euros) by sector.
Year
Non-financial corporations
Financial and insurance institutions
Public sector entities and nonprofit institutions
Households
Foreign markets
Total
Non-performing assets
Non-performing assets to total

2005
39,507
992
3,669
63,592
12,802
120,562
331
0.3%

2004
30,126
767
2,092
55,509
7,587
96,081
359
0.4%

2003
27,994
790
2,555
49,188
5,950
86,477
417
0.5%

2002
27,981
586
1,619
43,452
6,911
80,549
516
0.6%

2001
27,042
1,269
1,508
39,832
9,473
79,124
582
0.7%

The dataset includes firm-specific information, such as financial figures, and information
about bank-firm relationships, such as data about loans, their characteristics and the services provided
to firms. Both the firms’ financial figures and the bank–firm relationship data are captured at the end
of December in each year considered. In addition, banks evaluate and assign internal credit ratings to
firms. The internal ratings summarise information about firm quality and credit risk in broad terms,
and they are determined on the basis of firm-specific information. Internal ratings are assigned as a
part of complying with the Basel II capital adequacy rules by using the F-IRB (foundation internalrating-based approach) to estimate a firm’s probability of default1. All banks considered in our sample
rely on the same internal rating system that exploits the same set of variables, giving them the same
weight. This implies that the credit evaluation does not depend on the respective bank and that the
firms considered in our sample, which migrate from one bank to another, will be rated in the same
way. This aspect is not trivial since differences in the way in which banks evaluate and rate a firm
could have adversely affected the consistency of our results. The internal rating system used looks at a
firm’s performance and mainly relies on the information that the bank can access from the firm’s
financial report and from the bank’s system archives. The loan managers who deal with the customer
are in charge of feeding the system with data and revising the internal rating, typically on a yearly
basis, although riskier customers may be re-evaluated more frequently. The loan managers use the
internal rating system in order to make lending decisions. Loan managers are allowed some room for
manoeuvre. However, when the banks deal with more complex customers. i.e. customers who ask for
greater loans and who are considered riskier or who need finance for a complex project, the lending
decision is taken by their headquarters, where expert loan managers scrutinise the credit request and
the firm performance, instead of the locally operating loan manager. This happened in 195 cases in
our dataset and is the focus of our research.
The ratings are based on a scale ranging from 3 (highest quality) to 11 (lowest quality). The
absence of firms with ratings of 1 or 2 is due to the fact that none of the sample firms are publicly

1

Banks can use this approach only subject to approval from the Financial Supervisory Authority (FIN-
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listed, thus none can ever receive one of the top two internal ratings. The rating of each firm is
included in the dataset.
All banks in the sample are small local cooperative banks with strong links to the
communities they serve. Table 2 presents data about them.
Table 2. Bank Statistics
Capital adequacy ratio (in %) is the ratio of own funds to the total amount of risk-weighted items.
Non-performing assets (in %) is the ratio of non-performing assets including zero-interest and guaranteed
claims to claims on the public and off-balance sheet items.

Bank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Net profit
7,612.50
4,673.00
7,776.75
9,490.25
5,572.25
5,835.25
4,841.50
14,931.75
12,050.50
3,251.00
4,822.50
4,677.50
10,664.50
5,531.25
9,546.25
2,201.25
7,388.00
10,151.75
8,610.50
5,723.10
4,556.75

Assets
441,023.75
416,692.50
502,571.00
679,642.75
513,603.25
421,904.75
405,811.50
1,202,881.50
752,773.50
367,396.00
505,568.50
510,144.00
1,076,093.00
431,610.00
627,188.75
574,952.00
341,966.25
1,290,003.25
1,411,773.00
594,952.60
457,302.50

Equity
49,213.25
23,777.75
48,543.50
100,524.75
36,934.25
36,063.50
33,926.50
73,311.25
68,418.25
23,635.25
41,485.50
29,443.00
61,651.50
33,154.50
55,312.00
19,971.75
60,788.50
57,681.50
53,761.25
36,664.45
33,083.00

Capital adequacy Non-performing
ratio %
assets %
22.6
0.7
20.9
0.5
21.4
0.5
27.1
0.8
14.8
0.5
15.8
0.9
18.3
0.4
11.4
0.5
19.3
0.3
14.0
0.7
17.0
0.3
11.9
0.7
12.1
0.5
12.7
0.9
18.1
0.2
9.7
0.9
32.7
0.3
10.9
0.5
12.3
1.0
15.2
0.8
15.8
0.9

The banks show differences in terms of both assets and equity: in the case of assets, the largest
bank is almost 2.5 times the size of the smallest; regarding equity, the most capitalised bank is five
times the size of the least capitalised one. However, by relating these numbers to the overall banking
market in Finland, in which the total assets of all banks at the end of the sample period amount to
294 billion €, it is apparent that these differences are marginal. The level of non-performing assets
compared to total assets is extremely low and very similar for all the banks in the sample, reflecting
the similar levels of risk incurred by them.
B.
Methodology
In order to examine the impact of credit evaluations run centrally by loan managers with
expert knowledge, we differentiate between firms whose credit applications were evaluated centrally

The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance • Volume 19, No. 1 • Spring 2017

89

(n=195) and firms whose credit applications were evaluated locally (n=2,327). The analysis is carried
out using STATA version 14. In order to test H1, we regress the dummy variable SPEC, which
indicates whether the credit application was evaluated centrally, and a set of control variables on the
banks’ RAP using OLS. Then, we re-test H1 by using panel regression (random effects).
To test H2, we first investigate the selection process pursued by the bank and then whether
the loan managers contribute to the bank’s RAP. If loan managers with expert knowledge add to the
bank’s RAP because they deal with high-risk borrowers, we should find that banks assign loan
managers who have expert knowledge to highly opaque firms – and that these loan managers have a
positive impact on RAP when we look at the selected firms.
To account for the contextual factors that impact on our dependent variable but are not an
integral part of the phenomenon, we also include control variables in the model. As discussed above
opaqueness is a key contextual factor in lending decisions and impacts on the RAP of customers. As
there is no direct measure for opaqueness, we draw on a set of indirect measures that reflect
opaqueness. The proxies used are length of a relationship and the number of different banks with
which a firm has business relationships. Longer relationships with a smaller number of banks reflect
lower opaqueness for bank managers in loan decisions.
Due to the possibility that our results suffer from endogeneity linked to reverse causality, we
also implement a robustness check. Even if we find support for H1 (i.e. centrally managed customers
generate RAP for the bank) and H2 (i.e. centrally managed customers are high risk customers and
generate RAP for the bank), we cannot rule out completely that a bank’s decision to handle a
customer centrally instead of locally is linked to the customer’s profitability. Banks may decide to
centrally manage those customers whom they consider more worthwhile, so as to support them in
more complex projects and keep them satisfied. In order to control for reverse causality, we reestimate the regressions using lagged observations. If there is reverse causality, the regression with the
lagged observations should produce coefficients that are reversed.
IV.

Variables Description

A.
Dependent Variable
One of the distinctive features of this work is the dependent variable. In order to test the
hypotheses, we develop a measure for the RAP of banks. This measure is based on two different
components, namely the margin generated from a specific customer with respect to the products and
services sold by the bank (loans and other financial products or services) and the risk the bank incurs
by serving this customer.
The participating banks use activity-based costing to monitor the margin generated from
each customer. They calculate the margin as the difference between (1) the income generated from
the customer in terms of interest payments on short- and long-term loans as well as fees paid to the
bank, (2) the interest that the bank has to pay to the providers of funds (be they savers, bondholders,
etc.) plus the fees that the bank has to pay when it outsources or buys external financial services, and
(3) the cost of the time the bank’s personnel allocates to specific customers. The internal rating used
by the bank captures information about a customer’s financial position and is determined by firmspecific information. Lower credit quality, as reflected in these ratings, is likely to be associated with
less credit being granted, a higher loan price or more collateral being required. The measure of a
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bank’s RAP from a given customer is the ratio of the margin generated from the customer, in euros,
to the internal rating of that customer:

𝐑𝐀𝐏 =

𝐋𝐓𝐃
𝒊𝐒𝐓𝐃
𝐒𝐌𝐄 𝐒𝐓𝐃 + 𝒊𝐒𝐌𝐄 𝐋𝐓𝐃 − 𝒊𝐁𝐀𝐍𝐊 𝐒𝐓𝐃 + 𝐋𝐓𝐃 +
𝐑𝐀𝐓𝐈𝐍𝐆

(𝐟𝐞𝐞𝐒𝐌𝐄 − 𝐟𝐞𝐞𝐁𝐀𝐍𝐊 − 𝐏𝐞𝐫𝐬

where RAP is the risk-adjusted profitability, 𝒊𝐒𝐓𝐃
𝐒𝐌𝐄 is the specific interest rate charged to the
customer by the bank for short-term loans, 𝐒𝐓𝐃 is the amount of the short-term loan, 𝒊𝐋𝐓𝐃
𝐒𝐌𝐄 is the
specific interest rate charged to the customer by the bank for long-term loans, 𝐋𝐓𝐃 is the amount of
the long-term loan, 𝒊𝐁𝐀𝐍𝐊 is the average cost of funding for the bank, 𝐟𝐞𝐞𝐒𝐌𝐄 and 𝐟𝐞𝐞𝐁𝐀𝐍𝐊 are
respectively the fee received from the customer and the cost of services provided to that customer that
are outsourced or bought from other financial institutions, and Pers is the cost of the personnel
involved in assisting the customer. Typically, centrally managed customers involve a higher
proportion of personnel costs in their RAP. One reason for that is the transaction costs resulting
from information travelling up and down more levels of hierarchy. With regard to centrally handled
customers, loan managers need more time to become familiar with the specifics of the loan
application because they cannot draw on their experience and knowledge gained from direct
interaction with the customers.
B.
Independent and Control Variables
In order to test our hypotheses, we use a dummy variable that records whether a loan
manager makes a lending decision with expert knowledge in the headquarters of the bank (SPEC).
The dummy has a value of 1 when the lending decision is taken in the headquarters of the bank and
0 when it is taken in the local branch of the bank. A centrally pursued evaluation of a firm implies
that loan managers with expert knowledge, who are able to allocate more time and effort in assessing
the firm’s creditworthiness and the request for funds, are involved. As a consequence, the costs of the
bank increase. However, a more thorough evaluation of the firm might also allow for the
development of relational capital that increases the bank’s access to private information and may
therefore enhance cross-selling possibilities. This implies that there is no upfront certainty about the
relationship between SPEC and RAP. If the benefits gained from the additional information gathered
exceed the additional personnel costs, the relationship will be positive and significant. If, however,
the additional personnel costs out-weigh the benefits gained from the incremental information, the
relationship will be negative and significant. A non-significant relationship implies that the impact of
the centralisation of the lending decision on RAP is not clear.
We also add a set of controls. First, we control for the length of the relationship between a
firm and a bank, expressed in years (LENGTH). The length of the relationship is an indicator of
relationship strength that is widely used in the prior literature (Berger and Udell 1995; Petersen and
Rajan 1994). Since the length of the relationship increases the amount of knowledge and reduces the
incremental costs faced by the bank in evaluating the firm’s riskiness and its financial needs, we
expect a positive relationship between LENGTH and the bank’s RAP. Second, we control for the
number of relationships the SME has with other banks (RELATIONSHIPS). A firm’s diversification
of its banking services across several sources is expected to be negatively associated with the bank’s
RAP (Elsas 2005).
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Third, we control for the amount of loans using the total amount of loans the bank provides
to the firm (TOTALLOANS), since the amount of loans can be an important factor in deciding to
transfer the lending decision from the local loan manager to the headquarters. We expect the amount
of loans to be positively associated with the bank’s RAP, since interest income increases the bank’s
margin (as long as it does not increase borrower risk too much). Moreover, we control for the firm’s
size, which is expressed by its assets (FIRM_ASSETS). Firms with larger assets need more funds to
finance them and are thus expected to rely more on both long-term and short-term loans. At the
same time, larger assets implicitly provide a greater capability for the bank to recover the loans if the
firm defaults, thus reducing the bank’s risk. As a consequence, we expect a firm’s assets to be
positively related to a bank’s RAP.
Since the bargaining power of the customer is one of the core factors that affect a bank’s
RAP, we control for the bargaining power of the customer, over and above its firm size. An SME’s
non-size-related bargaining power is measured using its equity-to-debt ratio (EQUITY_RATIO).
Firms with a high equity-to-debt ratio are considered financially sound and thus better able to deal
with any difficulties. The intrinsic financial solidity of firms with high equity-to-debt ratios puts
them in a better position to negotiate better loan terms (particularly regarding the interest rates
charged) and lower fees for other banking services.
A firm’s profitability is included by using its return on equity (ROE). The ROE shows the
firm’s ability to generate profits to repay its loans. Additionally, according to pecking order theory, a
high ROE increases the firm’s ability to use retained profit to finance its on-going operations and
growth, thereby reducing its dependence on bank finance. The expectation is that a high ROE
decreases the bank’s RAP.
In order to control for overall market conditions, we include the change in gross domestic
product (CH_GDP).
Finally, we add a control for the bank’s size (BANK_ASSETS). RAP might be affected by a
bank’s size as larger banks are able to offer more products and services and can therefore have more
negotiating power and thus enjoy higher RAP. However, smaller banks might be more effective in
selecting and keeping customers by relying on their relationship with a firm, and can thus face
reduced risk that can be transformed into higher RAP. Since the direction of the effect is not clear,
we do not have any expectations about whether this variable is positive or negative.
V.
Summary Statistics
Table 3 presents the summary statistics of the variables considered.
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Table 3. Summary Statistics
The data are bank–firm relationships of small and medium-sized firms located in Finland from year 2001 to 2005. All
data are expressed in quantities, as percentages or in euros. The bank–firm relationship is classified as centrally managed if
a loan manager in the bank’s headquarters manages the loan. The bank–firm relationship is classified as locally managed
if a loan manager in a local branch of the bank manages the loan.

RAP has an average value of 798, but with values spread from -3 (the least profitable
relationship from a bank’s point of view) to 9,003 (the most profitable relationship from a bank’s
point of view). This means that banks are able to extract margins from on-going relationships, the
losses being almost exclusively linked to the default of the customer and the consequent write-offs
that banks have to record. The average RAP of the subgroup of centrally evaluated firms is 2,261,
whereas the average RAP of the subgroup of locally evaluated firms is 675. The existence of multiple
bank relationships per SME is 0.115 on average, with 0.354 in centrally evaluated firms and 0.095 in
locally evaluated firms. The average length of the relationship in our sample is approximately 15
years, the longest relationship being 66 years, which suggests stable relationships between the SMEs
and the banks. Our average relationship length is longer than the average length found in the seminal
works by Berger and Udell (1995) and Petersen and Rajan (1995, 1994). However, it is in line with
papers focusing on Europe (Harhoff and Körting 1998; Hernandez-Canovas and Martınez-Solano
2010; Howorth and Moro 2012; Moro et al. 2012).
On average, a firm’s total loans amount to 2.2 million Euros. However, centrally evaluated
firms tend to have considerably higher total loans than locally evaluated firms. The average amount
of a firm’s assets is 1.3 million Euros, and the average equity ratio is 26.2%, suggesting that the
average firm is quite leveraged. A firm’s ROE amounts to an average of 37.5%. Interestingly, firms in
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the subgroup of locally evaluated firms are more profitable in terms of their ROE than firms in the
subgroup of centrally evaluated firms.
In terms of correlations, RAP is positively correlated to SPEC and TOTALLOANS. As
expected, FIRM ASSETS is positively correlated to RAP. SPEC is correlated with FIRM ASSETS,
suggesting that centrally evaluated firms are bigger in terms of their total assets.
VI.

Econometric Results

A.
Main Results
In order to test the first hypothesis, we estimate two regressions (OLS and panel regression
with random effects) that include a dummy as a core variable that reports who evaluated the
customer, i.e. loan managers who operate in a bank’s local branch (0) or loan managers who operate
at its headquarters (1). The regressions also include a set of controls like the relationship’s strength,
borrower characteristics, overall market conditions (change in GDP), bank-specific differences
(BANK_ASSETS) and year dummies. Table 4 reports the regression results.
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Table 4. Regression of the Role of the Bank Specialist on RAP
The dependent variable is a bank’s RAP, measured at the financial year-end.
OLS

Name

Description

RANDOM EFFECTS

Number of obs.

2522 Number of obs.

F(12, 2509)

35.35 Wald chi2(12)

Prob > F

0.000 Prob > chi2

0.000

R-squared

0.487 R-squared (within)

0.049

Root MSE

0.718 R-squared (between)

0.465

Coef. Std. Err.

P>|t|

2522
161.84

Coef. Std. Err.

P>|z|

SPEC

Centrally (1) vs locally (0) managed customers

0.473

0.131 ***

0.552

0.223 ***

LENGTH

Length of the relation

0.066

0.015 ***

0.066

0.027 ***

TOTALLOANS

Total amount of loans

0.432

0.043 ***

0.133

0.048 ***

FIRM_ASSETS

Firm assets

0.354

0.056 ***

EQUITY_RATIO

Firm's equity ratio

ROE

0.436

0.093 ***

-0.008

0.015

-0.065

0.021 ***

Firm's return on equity

0.007

0.012

0.008

0.012

CH_GDP

Change in GDP

0.001

0.014

-0.014

0.009

BANK_ASSETS

Bank assets

0.034

0.019 *

0.026

0.029

Year
2002

-0.034

0.051

-0.016

0.038

2003

-0.057

0.047

-0.020

0.038

2004

0.290

0.054 ***

0.212
-0.130

2005
CONSTANT

0.107

0.044 ***

0.053 ***

0.025

0.043

0.045 ***

-0.078

0.042

rho

0.596

sigma_u

0.503

sigma_e

0.414

* Sig. at .10, ** Sig. at .05, ***Sig. at .01.
Variable Description:
SPEC is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if a firm is managed centrally and 0 otherwise.
LENGTH is the length of a bank–firm relationship.
TOTALLOANS is the total amount of loans that a firm has from the respective bank.
FIRM_ASSETS is the total amount of a firm’s assets at the financial year-end.
EQUITY_RATIO is a percentage of a firm’s equity to its total assets.
ROE is a firm’s return on equity.
CH_GDP is the change in GDP.
BANK_ASSETS is the total amount of a bank’s assets at the financial year-end.

The first regression (OLS) is significant (p < .000) and has an R2 of 0.487. The White test
suggests some level of heteroscedasticity in the model. Thus, we use robust standard errors
estimation. At the same time, the regression does not present collinearity problems2. The length of

2

All VIF-values are below 5, the mean VIF-value is 2.20.
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the relationship (LENGTH) is highly significant and positive. Looking at the interest-related
products, TOTALLOANS is positive, as expected, and is highly significant. Thus, there is evidence
that the strength of the relationships and the amount of short- and long-term loans provided to
SMEs contribute to a bank’s RAP. As expected, a firm’s size (FIRM_ASSETS) impacts positively on
a bank’s RAP, while a firm’s financial solidity (EQUITY_RATIO) and profitability (ROE) are not
significant. Finally, market conditions (CH_GDP) are not significant, whereas the control for bank
size (BANK_ASSETS) is weakly positive and significant.
Our variable of interest (SPEC) is positive and significant, suggesting that centrally evaluated
firms contribute positively to a bank’s RAP. This positive relationship suggests that the benefits
linked to the activities pursued by centrally operating loan managers with expert knowledge for the
respective customer prevail over the additional costs accrued because of the extra time and possibly
higher personnel costs.
The second regression presents the results estimated using a panel random effect regression.
In this regression the firm-specific effects are assumed to be uncorrelated with the independent
variables. The regression is significant (p < .000)3. The relationship variables follow the same pattern
as in the other specification: LENGTH and TOTALLOANS are positive and significant. Regarding
firm variables, FIRM_ASSETS is highly significant and positive. In this specification,
EQUITY_RATIO is highly significant and is negative as was expected. In line with the first
regression CH_GDP and BANK_ASSETS are not significant. Further, SPEC is positive and
significant, confirming the role centrally operating loan managers with expert knowledge play in
contributing to a bank’s profitability.
However, this first level of analysis only tells us that centrally managed customers are able to
contribute to the bank’s RAP, but does not tell us the reasons why. In order to investigate why
customers are managed centrally (H2) we estimate an instrumental variable regression with an
endogenous regressor. First, we separately estimate a probit regression for SPEC on a set of
independent variables and year dummies4. We model the selection process according to a firm’s
information asymmetry, the firm’s characteristics (risk of the firm) and its performance. As far as
information asymmetry is concerned, we use a set of variables that measure whether a bank is
adversely affected in accessing information. More specifically, we look at the firm’s number of
relationships with other banks (RELATIONSHIPS) and its length of the relationship with the bank
(LENGTH). In terms of risk we include the amount of the firm’s assets (FIRM_ASSETS), the
amount of loans (TOTALLOANS), the return on equity (ROE) and the equity ratio
(EQUITY_RATIO). The results are reported in table 5.

3
4

2

2

Within R of 0.049 and between R of 0.465.
VIF values are below 5, the mean VIF value is 1.08.
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Table 5. Probability of a Firm to be Managed Centrally or Locally
The dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is managed centrally and 0 otherwise.
PROBIT SPEC
Number of obs.

2522

Wald chi2(12)

209.90

Prob > chi2

0.000

Pseudo R2

0.295

Log pseudolikehood
Name

Description

Coef.

-484.200

Std. Err.

P>t

Selection of lending evaluation
RELATIONS

Number of bank relations

0.179

0.034

***

LENGTH

Length of the relation

-0.231

0.051

***

TOTALLOANS

Total amount of loans

0.224

0.048

***

FIRM_ASSETS

Firm assets

0.405

0.060

***

EQUITY_RATIO

Firm's equity ratio

0.157

0.040

***

ROE

Firm's return on equity

-0.030

0.049

CH_GDP

Change in GDP

0.055

0.045

BANK_ASSETS

Bank assets

-0.007

0.052

2002

0.447

0.282

2003

0.368

0.284

2004

0.705

0.280

**

2005

0.648

0.281

**

-2.213

0.269

***

Year

CONSTANT

* Sig. at .10, ** Sig. at .05, ***Sig. at .01.
Variable Description:
RELATIONS is the number of bank relationships that a firm has.
LENGTH is the length of a bank–firm relationship.
TOTALLOANS is the total amount of loans that a firm has from the respective bank.
FIRM_ASSETS is the total amount of a firm’s assets at the financial year-end.
EQUITY_RATIO is a percentage of a firm’s equity to its total assets.
ROE is a firm’s return on equity.
CH_GDP is the change in GDP.
BANK_ASSETS is the total amount of a bank’s assets at the financial year-end.

We find that the relationship variables (RELATIONSHIPS, LENGTH, TOTALLOANS) as
well as ASSETS and EQUITY_RATIO are significant. All of these variables are positive except for
LENGTH. Our findings suggest that the probability of being evaluated by loan managers in the
bank’s headquarters decreases with the length of the relationship and increases with the number of
banks the firm borrows from. This implies that more opaque firms are more likely to be managed
centrally. In addition, the probability of being evaluated by loan managers in the bank’s headquarters
increases with the amount of loans provided to the borrower, possibly because higher lending

The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance • Volume 19, No. 1 • Spring 2017

97

volumes increase the potential loss at default and therefore the bank’s risk. Finally, the probability of
being evaluated centrally increases with the firm’s assets, implying that centrally operating loan
managers with expert knowledge are asked to deal with more complex projects that require a more
thorough evaluation of the customer. All in all, the regression suggests that firms evaluated by
centrally operating loan managers with expert knowledge are more opaque and riskier, and invest
more. As a consequence, they are also more complex to deal with. However, are firms that are more
complex to deal with also the ones that generate higher RAP for the bank?
To answer this question, we re-estimate our model by using instrumental variable regression
(TREATREG). This allows us to examine whether centrally managed firms are also the ones that
impact positively on RAP. The results are reported in table 6.
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Table 6. Instrumental Variable Regression of the Role of Bank Specialists on RAP
The dependent variable in the first-stage is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is centrally managed and 0
otherwise. The dependent variable in the second-stage is the bank’s RAP, measured at the financial year-end.
TREATREG
Number of obs.

2522

Wald chi2(12)

419.87

Prob > chi2

0.000

F(1,2513)

16.195

Prob > F
Name

Description

0.000
Coef.

Std. Err.

P>|z|

Selection of lending evaluation
RELATIONS

Number of bank relations

0.176

0.035

***

LENGTH

Length of the relation

-0.221

0.051

***

TOTALLOANS

Total amount of loans

0.179

0.037

***

FIRM_ASSETS

Firm assets

0.423

0.062

***

EQUITY_RATIO

Firm's equity ratio

0.160

0.040

***

ROE

Firm's return on equity

-0.041

0.049

CH_GDP

Change in GDP

BANK_ASSETS

Bank assets

0.055

0.045

-0.010

0.052

Regression on RAP
SPEC

Lending technology

0.407

0.148

***

LENGTH

Length of the relation

0.064

0.015

***

TOTALLOANS

Total amount of loans

0.435

0.043

***

FIRM_ASSETS

Firm assets

0.362

0.057

***

EQUITY_RATIO

Firm's equity ratio

-0.001

0.015

ROE

Firm's return on equity

0.007

0.011

CH_GDP

Change in GDP

0.001

0.013

BANK_ASSETS

Bank assets

0.035

0.018

2002

-0.034

0.051

2003

-0.057

0.047

2004

0.290

0.054

***

2005

0.212

0.053

***

-0.125

0.045

***

*

Year

CONSTANT

rho

0.047

sigma

0.716

lambda

0.034

* Sig. at .10, ** Sig. at .05, ***Sig. at .01.
Variable Description:
RELATIONS is the number of bank relationships that a firm has.
LENGTH is the length of a bank–firm relationship.
TOTALLOANS is the total amount of loans that a firm has from the respective bank.
FIRM_ASSETS is the total amount of a firm’s assets at the financial year-end.
EQUITY_RATIO is a percentage of a firm’s equity to its total assets.
ROE is a firm’s return on equity.
CH_GDP is the change in GDP.
BANK_ASSETS is the total amount of a bank’s assets at the financial year-end.
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We determine the strength of our instrument by calculating the F statistics. The F value is
16.20 and not smaller than the critical value, which supports the view that our instrument is not
weak. The model suggests that the coefficients of the selection of customer evaluation are
qualitatively similar to those of the probit model. In addition, the results on RAP are close to the
results of OLS regression on RAP. Finally, in the instrumental regression, SPEC is positive and
significant, suggesting that firms which are evaluated by loan managers in a bank’s headquarters
increase the bank’s RAP. Thus, we find support for the fact that banks select more opaque, riskier
and more complex firms to be evaluated by centrally operating loan managers, who are, in turn, able
to extract profitability from them.
B.
Robustness Checks
As discussed in the hypotheses section, banks might decide to manage firms centrally because
they consider them important due to the possibility to generate a high RAP. In this case, the bank
would be aware of the additional value provided by these firms and therefore decide to deal with
them centrally in order to grant them a high quality service and to consolidate their relationship with
them. As a consequence, there would be reverse causality between RAP and being centrally managed.
In order to investigate this possible issue, we re-estimate the regression using one-year lagged
variables. If centrally managed firms are the ones that are considered more important for the bank
because of the RAP they are generating, we should find a negative significant relationship between
the variable of interest (SPEC) and RAP. The results are reported in table 7.
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Table 7. Regression of the Role of Bank Specialists on Lagged RAP
The dependent variable is the bank’s RAP lagged one year.
OLS, lagged

Name

Description

Number of obs.

1729

F(12, 2509)

38.15

Prob > F

0.000

R-squared

0.583

Root MSE

0.638

Coef. Std. Err.

P>|t|

SPEC

Centrally (1) vs locally (0) managed customers

0.502

0.155 ***

LENGTH

Length of the relation

0.063

0.018 ***

TOTALLOANS

Total amount of loans

0.456

0.039 ***

FIRM_ASSETS

Firm assets

0.343

0.076 ***

EQUITY_RATIO

Firm's equity ratio

0.002

0.018

ROE

Firm's return on equity

-0.007

0.014

CH_GDP

Change in GDP

0.022

0.016

BANK_ASSETS

Bank assets

0.033

0.020

2003

-0.022

0.052

2004

-0.044

0.051

Year

2005
CONSTANT

0.226

0.055 ***

-0.119

0.051 **

* Sig. at .10, ** Sig. at .05, ***Sig. at .01.
Variable Description:
SPEC is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if a firm is managed centrally and 0 otherwise.
LENGTH is the length of a bank–firm relationship.
TOTALLOANS is the total amount of loans that a firm has from the respective bank.
FIRM_ASSETS is the total amount of a firm’s assets at the financial year-end.
EQUITY_RATIO is a percentage of a firm’s equity to its total assets.
ROE is a firm’s return on equity.
CH_GDP is the change in GDP.
BANK_ASSETS is the total amount of a bank’s assets at the financial year-end.

The regression is significant (p < .000). LENGTH and TOTALLOANS are positive and
significant. As far as the variables of a firm are concerned, only FIRM_ASSETS is significant and has
the expected result. In line with the first model, CH_GDP is not significant and BANK_ASSETS is
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positive, but not significant. Interestingly, SPEC is again positive and significant. This evidence rules
out reverse causality.
Finally, it might be argued that our analysis suffers from endogeneity, since the dependent
variable is affected by the internal rating of a firm as well as the decision process, which is manifested
in the independent variables. In order to rule out this issue, we retest our specifications using the
absolute return of the customer as a dependent variable (detailed results not reported here).
Interestingly, we obtain the same results as the ones presented in tables 4 to 7. More importantly, the
variable SPEC is always positive and significant. In addition, its coefficients are not significantly
different from those presented in tables 4 to 7.
VII. Discussion
Our analysis provides interesting results that are in line with the findings of Stein (2002) and
Liberti and Mian (2009). Lending approaches change according to the type of customer and the
information banks can access. Customers whose creditworthiness is easy to evaluate, because the
information about them is mainly soft and accessible for local loan managers as well as those who
need plain vanilla loans, are managed by loan managers in local branches of the bank. In contrast,
customers who are characterised by a high level of information asymmetry, who pursue highly
complex projects or who increase the exposure of the bank regarding the amount of the loan, are
managed by loan managers in the bank’s headquarters. In the latter case, banks can be adversely
affected by the loss of soft information, but at the same time benefit from the expert knowledge of
the loan managers involved in evaluating the creditworthiness of the customers.
Our results suggest that this strategy pays. By evaluating “simple” customers locally, banks
can benefit from reduced costs in managing them and local loan managers can exploit their personal
knowledge of them. Regarding “complex” customers, a bank’s centrally operating loan managers with
expert knowledge are able to turn high risk and potentially low return customers into highly
rewarding ones by increasing the bank’s RAP. This happens for various reasons. First, loan managers
who operate centrally are able to employ their expertise to make an informed decision about whether
to lend to a customer or not. In addition, not only are they able to price a loan according to the
riskiness of the customer, they can also propose and sell financial products (e.g. loans) that better fit
the customer’s needs, implicitly reducing the risk the bank can incur when the borrower is asked to
deal with a loan that does not match its cash flows.
Since centrally operating loan managers increase the RAP realized from the respective
customer, banks could be tempted to move lending decisions entirely to their headquarters.
However, our analysis suggests that this would be the wrong way to operate since loan managers who
operate locally are able to generate RAP. The complete centralisation of the lending decision process
would lead to an ineffective and inefficient use of resources. This point is strongly supported by the
key role played by local loan managers in our sample: the largest majority of the loans (more than
92%) are managed by loan managers in local branches and contribute to the profitability of the bank.
This implies that local loan managers are able to contribute dramatically to a bank’s profitability. At
the same time, the limited number of loans that are managed by loan managers in a bank’s
headquarters suggests that banks are very selective about allocating firms to centrally operating loan
managers with expert knowledge. Possibly, they are aware of the additional costs incurred by
involving expert staff and thus try to keep their use of them to a minimum.
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VIII. Conclusion
For many years, research on bank lending has investigated how both soft and hard factors
affect lending relationships. Firm characteristics, such as the age of a firm, the length of a lending
relationship and the concentration of the bank system are just some of the aspects that have been
examined and their impact on both banks (in terms of reduction of the risk incurred) and firms (in
terms of access to credit) have been discussed. In particular, Stein (2002) and Liberti and Mian
(2009) proposed that banks should employ different lending approaches according to the customers
they have and the information they are able to exploit. Whereas complex customers who can mainly
provide hard, factual data should be analysed centrally, less complex but very opaque customers
should be examined locally by using soft information.
Our findings provide support for Stein's (2002) arguments. We find that banks are
able to extract profitability from their lending relationships both when they manage their borrowers
in the bank’s headquarters and in its local branches. Nevertheless, borrowers who are evaluated
centrally are those who bear greater risk, since they are more complex and characterised by a higher
degree of opaqueness that can only partially be addressed by centrally operating loan managers. By
managing high-risk customers in a bank’s headquarters, banks are able to reduce the risk and to
extract RAP from them as well. In particular, we contribute to Stein (2002) and Liberti and Mian
(2009) by showing that communication in hierarchies allows for specialised knowledge
accumulation. Our findings also contribute to Garicano's (2000) notions of the specialisation of
knowledge in hierarchies, not just the transmission of information.
However, our research has several limitations: first, it relies on a dataset that considers only
observations from Finland. Prospective research should try to investigate whether our findings hold
true in other bank contexts. Second, it uses data from before 2008. We cannot rule out that the
financial crisis and the changes in the banking regulation impacted on the way banks decide how to
treat borrowers. In particular, it would not be very surprising to discover that banks now manage a
larger percentage of borrowers centrally.
Notwithstanding these limitations, this study indicates that banks are able to properly select
and manage their borrowers: they can extract RAP from both easy-to-treat borrowers, who are
managed locally, and more complex borrowers, who are managed centrally by loan managers with
expert knowledge.
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